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Hisamatsu’s Philosophy of Awakening
Abe Masao
In the course of his long life of ninety years, Hisamatsu Shin’ichi wrote 
numerous books and delivered countless lectures covering a wide range of 
subjects: contemporary trends in philosophy, theories of religion, Christian 
theology, Western mysticism, Buddhist thought, sutras, sastras, Zen texts, 
and the problems of art, history, society, and politics. Essentially, though, 
he was concerned with expressing just one thing: “Awakening*' as the 
fundamental self-realization of man. For Hisamatsu, the problem was 
never what to say. From beginning to end, what he wanted to say was 
invariably settled, and unmistakably clear. The problem was only how 
to express it in adapting it to the general tendencies of philosophy, religion, 
and history, and in response to those whom he addressed, so as to make 
them awaken to it.
Although I said that what he spoke of was invariably settled, this 
does not mean it is in any way fixed as “something.” Actually, its being 
always clear as no “something” whatsoever is precisely why it remains 
invariably settled. Since it remains settled in this sense, it expresses 
itself freely in accordance with everything. Such an ever-clear realization 
as the agent of free and unrestricted self-expression, Hisamatsu refers to 
as Awakening. All of his philosophical utterances are self-expressions 
of this Awakening. Accordingly, his “philosophy of Zen,” if we may call 
it that, is nothing other than a “philosophy of Awakening.”
Philosophy, however, was not the only mode of expression of this 
fundamental Awakening. Calligraphy, painting, and poetry all became 
vehicles of awakened self-expression. Hisamatsu was especially fond of 
the tea ceremony, which for him was also an expression of the same 
Awakening, transcending all tea schools and ceremonial forms. In fact, 
everything about his life—his everyday conversation, his way of receiving
♦ This article was originally published in Japanese as “Hisamatsu Shin'ichi Sensei 
no Kaku no Tetsugaku,” JRiso 424 (September 1968), pp. 10-24.
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callers, his laughter and silence—was a self-expression of Awakening. Here 
again, what was expressed was always the same, yet how it was expressed 
differed with the time and the occasion.
To understand Hisamatsu and his philosophy of Awakening, the most 
important thing for us to realize is that the same what was always expressed 
in all of his activities, whether philosophy, art, or life itself. Prior to any 
of his expressions, his very being, his Self, was that what—the fundamental 
self-realization of man embodied in the word Awakening.
Hisamatsu’s philosophy, then, however important it may be, was but 
one of many self-expressions of his Awakening, all stemming from the 
same source. The philosophy of Awakening differs in no way from a 
flower arranged by Hisamatsu for the tea ceremony. In that one flower 
his philosophy is fully manifested. Those who cannot see the philosophy 
of Awakening in that flower will fail to see it in his philosophical works as 
well. The same can be said of an ordinary word of greeting spoken by 
Hisamatsu. Containing the philosophy of Awakening, his greeting of 
“How are you?” inquires directly into the foundation of the other's 
existence, and turns him towards the Awakening of himself. Only someone 
able to respond to the question contained in such a greeting can compre­
hend Hisamatsu’s philosophy of Awakening.
The philosophy of Awakening differs, then, from ordinary philosophy. 
Kierkegaard criticized Hegel for building a grand philosophical structure 
while remaining himself in a wretched hovel next door. The philosophy 
of Awakening is no conceptual structure formed through speculation 
and devoid of a master. It is closer to Kierkegaard’s thought than to 
Hegel’s. Kierkegaard’s philosophy was inseparable from his own existence, 
yet he was by his own admission still a “Christ-in-the-making” (Werdender 
Christ ; in An Unscientific Postscript, 1846). The philosophy of Awakening, 
on the other hand, is the philosophy of a Buddha—an awakened one 
himself—not of a Buddha-in-the-making.
In this sense, the philosophy of Awakening has a greater affinity to 
Socrates or Spinoza than to Kierkegaard. It has points in common, for 
example, with the unity of knowledge and action reflected in Socrates’ 
admonition “Know thyself,” and with Spinoza’s intoxication with God. 
Yet no matter how closely interwoven their philosophy and life may have 
been, or how practical, intelligible, and intuitive the rational bases of their 
philosophies, they still did not break beyond the frame of reason. Neither 
of their philosophies is ever totally manifested, in the way in which the 
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philosophy of Awakening is fully expressed in a flower arranged by 
Hisamatsu or in a greeting he has uttered.
In contrast to ordinary philosophy, the philosophy of Awakening con­
tains within it an element of absolute self-negation which breaks beyond 
the frame of reason. Without ceasing to be a philosophy of Awakening, 
it can totally manifest itself in laughter or silence, in a flower or a word of 
greeting. In this sense, it is not Socratic or Spinozian. It is not philosophy 
as it is understood in the West, but Awakening itself. Hisamatsu, the 
philosopher of Awakening, was not a philosopher in the ordinary sense: 
he was an awakened man.
How to awaken to the what which is constantly self-determined, and 
how to express it in order to bring others to Awakening, are matters which 
go beyond the realms of philosophy and art. They belong to religion itself, 
and constitute what Hisamatsu calls the “religion of Awakening.” His 
“religion of Awakening” is thus in no way different from his “philosophy 
of Awakening.” In Awakening, philosophy and religion are one, not 
two. Accordingly, everything he did—in scholarship, in art, in life itself— 
was done as a “total person,” in whom the philosopher and the man of 
religion were one and the same.
ii
In an autobiographical essay entitled “Memories of My Student Life,”1 
Hisamatsu said that he had aspired to become a man of religion from an 
early age. Raised in a devout Shin Buddhist family, he became, in his own 
words, a “steadfast young believer” (417). But after he was introduced to 
scientific knowledge in junior high school, a rational, critical spirit awoke 
in him, and this, in turn, gave rise to numerous doubts. By the time he 
graduated, his faith had all but disappeared. Referring to himself in the 
third person, as he does throughout this essay, he says that he underwent a 
“conversion from the religious life of naive religious belief which avoids 
rational doubt, to the critical life of modem man based on autonomous 
rational judgement and empirical proof.. .. [At the same time] his 
rational awareness of sin deepened and, though desiring to be rid of it, 
1 The essay “Memories of My Student Life” (GakkyU seikatsu no omoide) is found in 
Toyd-teki Mu (Oriental Nothingness), Vol. I of The Collected Works of Hisamatsu 
Shin'ichi (Tokyo, 1969), pp. 415-34; hereafter referred to as Memories. Page numbers 
in parentheses refer to this essay.
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he neither thought he was destined for hell as a result nor did he long to 
be rescued from hell and reborn in paradise’* (418). In hopes of solving this 
dilemma, he turned to rational inquiry. He took up the study of philosophy 
under Nishida Kitarfi2 at Kyoto University. Nishida’s “penetrating 
philosophical insight and deep religious experience” (425), his character 
and lectures, revived Hisamatsu’s fundamental religious concern, and 
opened up for him a new philosophical perspective on religion.
2 Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945), the most outstanding philosopher of modem Japan, 
established a unique system of philosophy based on his deep Zen experience. One of the 
basic notions of his philosophy is “Absolute Nothingness,” around which the Kyoto 
School, as it has come to be known, developed. As professor of philosophy at Kyoto 
University from 1914-1928, he had many excellent students, Hisamatsu being one of 
his earlier ones.
But he soon confronted existential problems that were unsolvable 
through philosophy. Finally, deeply despairing of reason, he resolved to 
“break through this aporia by means of Zen” (426). Nishida advised him 
to do sanzen (Zen practice) under Ikegami Shozan Roshi (1856-1928), a 
Zen master of the Mydshinji monastery. During his first Rohatsu sesshin 
(December retreat) under Shozan Roshi, Hisamatsu turned into Great 
Doubt and broke through it to achieve kensho (seeing one’s Nature):
It was not that he had reached an impasse while trying to solve objec­
tively some particular problem. Nor was it that he had failed to solve 
objectively an all-encompassing universal problem, which then became 
a great doubt in his mind. Rather, he himself had totally become the 
Great Doubting Mass. In the manner of “being cornered, changing; 
changing, passing through,” right at that moment the Great Doubting 
Mass crumbled apart and melted like ice from within ... leaving not 
even a hair’s space between him and Shozan Roshi. Awakened to his 
formless, free True Self, he gazed upon Shozan’s True Face for the 
first time. ... He had awakened to the truth of “no-birth-and-death” 
which is beyond being and nonbeing; he had realized the meaning of 
“no-thought-of-good-and-evil” which is apart from value and anti­
value. [432-3]
In “Memories of My Student Life,” the earnest quest made by Hisama­
tsu in the period of his life up until his kensho is set forth in some detail. 
What I have given here is merely an outline. To understand the standpoint 
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of this radically subjective3 philosopher, his process of inquiry must be 
constantly kept in mind, for it forms the background of his intellectual 
development. Ultimately, the standpoint of Awakening is none other 
than the place of final resolution at the end of that process. I would now 
like to clarify Hisamatsu’s philosophy of Awakening in the light of that 
process of inquiry.
3 “Subjective” (shutai-teki does not indicate “subjective” (shukan-teki ±Wj)
in the epistemological sense as opposed to “objective” (kyakkan-teki Rather,
it refers to the dynamic existential self involved in responsible, self-determined action 
of a moral, ethical, or religious nature.
in
Since Western philosophy was introduced in the Meiji period (1868-1912), 
this highly rational and logical discipline has attracted a great number of 
Japanese struggling with the problems of life. Many of them turned to 
philosophy because of dissatisfaction with their ordinary way of life, or 
with the scientific world-view; others were deeply troubled by ethical 
shortcomings or moral predicaments. They turned to philosophy in search 
of something with more fundamental meaning and value. Those whose 
problem was of a religious nature from the start, sought in philosophy a 
means to probe their religious concern in greater depth.
In contrast, Hisamatsu turned to philosophy only after he had taken 
leave of the religion in which he was reared and deeply believed. He said 
in retrospect that his faith had been merely a case of “leave-it-up-to-the- 
Almighty-ism which avoided all doubt” (418). It is certain, however, that 
as a result of the religious atmosphere in which he had been brought up, 
that faith had been deeply ingrained in him in the early years before he 
turned to philosophy. Because of this, even after his faith had been de­
stroyed by rational skepticism, his rational awareness of sin became increas­
ingly acute and he earnestly longed to free himself from it.
With a motivation of this intensity turning him to philosophy, the 
nature of his philosophical inquiry differed somewhat from that of other 
young people of his time. It is a remarkable coincidence that Hisamatsu’s 
philosophical inquiries began under the guidance of a man with as much 
penetrating insight and deep religious experience as Nishida Kitard, a 
scholar who espoused a philosophy of pure subjectivity. In any case, to 
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Hisamatsu, philosophical inquiry was a problem neither of the theoretical 
cognition of the world nor of the objective validity of values.
For him—one who had become accustomed to considering things from 
the individual to the general, from the peripheral to the basic—the 
particular concrete problems he confronted at that time became the 
“moment” for his most fundamental problem. He dealt with individual 
problems one by one and eventually dug down to the universal 
source of all problems. The problem turned inward, from the ob­
jective to the subjective. No matter how profound his philosophical 
understanding might have been, however, insofar as it remained ob­
jective cognition, he was completely unable to solve the total, existen­
tial problem at hand. Faced with this dilemma, he could do nothing. 
Eventually, he attempted to existentially and fundamentally transform 
himself. That is to say, his great concern at that point was neither the 
objective pursuit of reality nor even the objective realization of his 
own way of being, but ontological self-transformation through 
practice. [425]
After eight years at Kyoto University, he had come to despair of phi­
losophy and of human reason itself. Before we criticize as hasty this 
negative appraisal of philosophy and of scholarship in general, we must 
first understand the meaning he attached to his philosophical inquiry, 
which takes us to an investigation of the fundamental significance of 
philosophy itself.
For Hisamatsu, reason was not merely a means for idealistically con­
templating the world of intelligibility in some transcendental beyond. 
Nor was it dualistic intellectual reason scrutinizing the objective world. 
More than anything else, it has to be autonomous reason, laying by itself 
the subjective foundation of the self and examining critically all dogmas 
and presuppositions, those of religion included. This is the reason of the 
modem age, typified by Cartesian logic, which broke beyond the bounds 
of scholastic theology through exhaustive application of radical doubt, 
and by Kantian reason, which criticized all philosophical presuppositions 
and established the standpoint of practical autonomy. The collapse of his 
naive faith and his resolution to “leave religion behind and pursue phi­
losophy grounded in reason” (419), led Hisamatsu naturally to the 
standpoint of autonomous reason described above, rather than to other 
types of philosophical thought.
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At the base of his resolve to turn from religion to philosophy, however, 
was a deeply existential religious concern not found at the base of modem 
reason. Lacking this fundamental religious concern, modern reason naively 
believes it can solve the problems of death and evil by further deepening 
the standpoint of autonomous reason; in this way, a transcendental, 
idealistic view of man has come to be established.
As we can see in Hisamatsu’s case, however, when a life whose primary 
concern is religion resolves to base itself on and thoroughly penetrate the 
standpoint of autonomous reason, that standpoint will inevitably crumble 
away to the extent it is penetrated, until, finally, the very foundation on 
which that life stands falls away altogether.
Viewed in a different way, it can be said that the further autonomy is 
penetrated the deeper one falls into a kind of self-entanglement, until the 
self-entanglement extends itself throughout one’s entire existence. Such 
self-binding, or self-collapse, is an inescapable self-contradiction inherent 
in autonomous reason. Hisamatsu’s rapid disillusionment with philosophy 
stems no doubt from his insight into this fact, together with his existential 
realization that modern autonomous reason, in the above sense, cannot be 
truly autonomous, and is itself, after all, merely another standpoint of 
objective knowledge.
Hisamatsu’s subsequent commitment to Zen can be seen as an attempt 
to break through the dilemma of this unavoidable self-entanglement which 
deepened as he penetrated autonomous reason, and led him inevitably to 
the Great Doubting Mass. This is substantiated by the description he 
gave of the circumstances leading up to his Awakening: “He cast off the 
religion of medieval belief, turned to philosophy grounded in modem 
reason, broke through the extreme limit of rational philosophy based on 
objective knowledge, and awakened to the free and unhindered True 
Self” (433). It was autonomous reason, characterized by self-contradic­
toriness, that played the decisive role in the establishment of Great Doubt 
and the eventual breakthrough into Awakening.
The kensho experiences4 of the men of Zen are the vital links which have 
transmitted the Zen Dharma to the present day. The Great Doubting 
Mass, however, has not always been emphasized as the necessary “mo­
4 Hisamatsu himself does not take kensho (seeing one’s Nature, insight into the Self) 
as an experience, for “experience” indicates something happening in time and space, 
whereas kensho by nature is transtemporal and transpatial.
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ment” of kenshG. The saying, “at the bottom of Great Doubt lies Great 
Awakening,” has, to be sure, often been quoted. But in the history of 
Zen, until Hisamatsu, the kind of self-contradiction found in modern au­
tonomous reason had never before constituted the dynamics behind the 
establishment of Great Doubt. This point is critical for comprehending 
Hisamatsu’s standpoint of Awakening.
The true kensho experience in Zen transcends historical and ethnic 
differences. It is identical in all times and in all people. This of course 
does not signify an abstract universality. Throughout the history of Zen, 
each Zen man has had his own characteristic “style,” the source of which 
is traceable to the individual nature of the kenshd experience. Even after 
taking into account the deep and thorough nature of Hisamatsu’s kensho, 
we cannot grasp the true individuality of his Zen “style” unless we under­
stand that his realization of the self-contradictoriness of autonomous 
reason, which broke beyond the limits of modem rational philosophy, was 
the decisive factor behind that experience.
IV
Although Hisamatsu’s realization of the self-contradictoriness of autonomous 
reason constituted the critical dynamics of both the establishment and the 
resolution of Great Doubt, this does not mean that his Great Doubt was 
mere intellectual skepticism, or that his Awakening was an intellectual or 
philosophical self-realization.
As we saw before, Hisamatsu realized the self-contradictoriness within 
autonomous reason because deeply rooted within his existence was a 
religious concern he was unable to deal with by means of that reason. 
This concern, an existential demand to live absolute truth, functioned 
at thebase of his existence both after the crumbling of naive, medieval faith, 
and while he was attempting to make the modem philosophy of reason 
into a new foundation of existence. This latent yet unchanging desire to 
live the truth, was, while remaining unsatisfied, stimulated, brought to 
the surface, and in that way, eventually realized. It was this intense, sub­
jective force that drove Hisamatsu beyond philosophy to Zen. To be sure, 
the “moment” behind this existential demand was nothing but autono­
mous reason as the base of the modern philosophy of reason.
This intense existential demand to live absolute truth, spurred by a 
keen realization of falsehood, is set forth vividly in a letter he wrote at the 
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time to his mentor, Nishida Kitaro. While this subjective demand was 
not intellectual or philosophical, neither was it by any means a religious 
desire to return to naive, medieval faith. As he states in his “Memories/’
When he parted from so-called theistic religion and despaired of phi­
losophy based on objective knowledge, the path he then chose had to 
be subjective knowledge grounded in practice and practice grounded 
in subjective knowledge, not mere religion or mere philosophy. It was 
as such a path that he chose Zen. [426]
He did not, then, choose Zen as one religious denomination among others 
or as the way of practice of a particular Buddhist sect. As one who had 
rejected the standpoints of both theocentric, heteronomous faith and 
anthropocentric, autonomous reason, he sought a religion without a god, 
an atheistic religion—a standpoint of absolute religious autonomy that 
transcends yet does not run contrary to rational autonomy.
This insuppressible need to find a standpoint beyond the extremes of 
theocentrism and homocentrism, or of heteronomy and autonomy, is a 
desire that springs from the most fundamental ground of being. A situation 
in which this presses us urgently from within and yet remains unsatisfied, 
is a crisis of the most fundamental order. It permeates our entire being. 
According to Hisamatsu, this crisis is neither absolute intellectual con­
tradiction, nor an absolute dilemma of the will, nor absolute emotional 
suffering—it is a total, absolute crisis in which these three become one.
The subject in which this absolute, all-encompassing crisis comes to 
awareness is precisely the “Great Doubting Mass” spoken of in Zen. 
Hisamatsu describes this mass of Doubt in the account of his first sesshin 
under Shozan Roshi: “He became a Great Doubting Mass, a vast expanse 
of total blackness. ... He changed into one great total mass of Doubt” 
(432). The universal wholeness of this Doubt is directly connected with 
its exhaustiveness and fundamentality. These three dimensions of Great 
Doubt are inseparable from the wholeness, exhaustiveness, and funda­
mentality of the Awakening in which that Doubt is resolved.
These characteristics of Hisamatsu’s Great Doubt and subsequent 
Awakening were sharpened and clarified by his realization of the self­
contradictoriness intrinsic in autonomous reason. Doubt or satori which 
lacks them cannot be true “Great Doubt” or true “Great Awakening.” 
The outstanding followers of Zen who have transmitted the Zen Dharma 
have all displayed these three dimensions. The originality of Hisamatsu’s 
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standpoint lies in the fact that, in his case, these three characteristics were 
attained by penetrating beyond rational philosophy based on objective 
knowledge.
v
The originality of Hisamatsu’s standpoint is even more evident in his 
Awakening itself, the new life which emerges from the Great Death in 
which Great Doubt dissolves away. The fundamental crisis of the entire 
person which appears in Great Doubt, Hisamatsu has termed absolute 
antinomy. For the standpoint of new life which emerges when one breaks 
through that crisis and extricates oneself from absolute antinomy, he uses 
the expression religio-nomy of the absolute Self (zettai jisha-teki shukyd 
ritsu IM0*M***), What is signified here?
The confrontation of life and death and the conflict of good and evil 
are the most critical problems in man’s religious life. Many people become 
attached to the life of the present self, and try to rid themselves of death 
by going beyond it and pursuing eternal life in the future. Although we 
search endlessly in this way for eternal life, we never attain it. There is no 
way for us to divest ourselves of death while standing within life, for life 
and death are originally like the two sides of a coin. Human beings are 
not existence that will die, but existence that is living-amf-dying at every 
moment. The crucial problem for religious man, then, is not to avoid 
death, but to extricate himself from living-and-dying, to die the absolute 
Death as the death of living-dying life. Likewise, in morality, we seek good 
and shrink from evil; we try to divest ourselves of evil in the present and 
arrive at some absolute good in the future. But, trying to rid ourselves of 
evil, like the attempt to rid oneself of death, can only result in transmigra­
tion in a false, misguided endlessness. Here too, the problem of ridding 
ourselves of sin as an absolute conflict between good and evil—as opposed 
to merely divesting oneself of evil—is an essentially religious concern.
The confrontation between life and death and the conflict between good 
and evil cannot exist apart from self-realization. Absolute Death—the 
dying to living-dying life—and sin as an absolute conflict between good 
and evil, constitute the absolute existential antinomy immanent in man. 
They are joined as a whole in the ground of human self-realization, and 
form the fundamental structure of that self-realization. Great Doubt, as 
the crisis of the whole person, is the total emergence of this absolutely 
antinomical structure of human self-realization.
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The problems of life-and-death and good and evil have not been ne­
glected by the Zen masters of the past. They have spoken of life-and-death 
as “the matter of gravest importance,” warning us that “man is imperma­
nent and passes quickly away.” They have said that we should “not commit 
evils but do all that is good.” Hisamatsu, however, does not deal with the 
problem of life-and-death merely as a problem of life and death; he 
universalizes it, takes it to its very source, and grasps it as the problem of 
existence-nonexistence. Likewise, he grasps the problem of good and 
evil on a more universal dimension, as the problem of value-antivalue. 
The absolute antinomy in Great Doubt, then, centers around existence­
nonexistence and value-antivalue.
Why does he universalize the problems of life-and-death and good and 
evil? The answer is found in the fact that he grasps the polarity of life and 
death and the conflict between good and evil through his realization of the 
inadequacy of “modern autonomous reason.” This is an indication of the 
wholeness, exhaustiveness, and fundamentality of his grasp of Great Doubt, 
and is related to his clear designation of Great Doubt as absolute subjective 
antinomy. From Hisamatsu’s standpoint, it is more accurate to say that 
subjective antinomy is Great Doubt than to say the reverse.
His abandonment of religion for philosophy based on reason, his attempt 
to penetrate the standpoint of autonomous reason, and his realization that 
such autonomy is itself a kind of self-entanglement, all combined to work 
as a stimulus in both the establishment and dissolution of Great Doubt. 
Hisamatsu, keenly realizing that autonomy based on reason could never 
be totally penetrated or even maintain itself, was unable to turn to hetero- 
nomous, theistic theonomy or to dwell in rational, atheistic autonomy. In 
the midst of this crisis, rational autonomy finally cast itself off. At that 
point, Great Doubt crumbled away and the Original Self came forth. 
Hisamatsu recounts this in the following way:
When autonomy cannot, by any means, be maintained as such, it must 
strip itself of the self.... The way of this negation must be such 
that it is not contradictory to autonomy. Autonomy is not simply 
negated; rather, through its own negation, it brings its original 
nature to complete realization. It gains new life. Life is not gained 
from something other than oneself. It comes from the ground of 




Resulting from this autonomous rebirth is the religio-nomy of the 
absolute Self the Awakening of the True, Formless Self. In the awakening 
of that Self, autonomous reason, caught in the crisis of being unable to 
maintain itself, is negated and cast off. To Hisamatsu, awakening to the 
True Self is inseparable from this negating and stripping away of autono­
mous reason. It is the emergence of original, absolute autonomy, which 
is not dependent on reason, God, or anything else. Hisamatsu writes,
With the awakening of the True Self, the rational self is cast off in 
negation. This results in autonomy of a deeper dimension, which has 
broken beyond and completely shaken off the limitations of rational 
autonomy. It is fundamental, absolute autonomy free of the fatalistic, 
absolute antinomy that characterizes rational autonomy.* 6
3 From “Mushinron” (Atheism), in Zettai shutai do (The Way of Absolute Subjec­
tivity), Vol. II of the Collected Works, pp. 53-93.
6 From “Zettai kiki to fukkatsu” (Ultimate Crisis and Resurrection) in Vol. II of his 
Collected Works, pp. 138-95. See Eastern Buddhist VIII, I (May 1975), pp. 12-29, and 
VIII, 2 (October 1975), pp. 37-66, for an English translation of this article.
Hisamatsu’s “Awakening,” then, is the awakening and emergence of this 
fundamental, absolute autonomy.
VI
What sort of perspective, or world, is this standpoint of Awakening? It is 
a world with neither God nor man, transcendence nor immanence, self 
nor other, mind nor matter, life nor death, good nor evil, right nor wrong, 
love nor hate, inner nor outer, movement nor stillness, time nor space, 
past nor future nor present. In Awakening, even the world described in 
this way does not exist. What, then, it may be asked, is the true world of 
Awakening? It is the world of pure “Nothingness” in which not a single 
thing exists. In Zen, it has been described in various ways: “empty space,” 
“aspectless,” “formless,” “no-thing,” “vastly open, without holiness,” 
“the emptiness of all things.” It is a realm with no polarity or discrimina­
tion, no spatial limits, and no temporal beginning or end. Moreover, since 
it is free of both delusion and satori, though we speak of a “world of 
Awakening,” this does not mean there is something called “Awakening.”
Pure Nothingness is not nothingness immanent in human beings. It 
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has no trace of human nature, and is, for that reason, an absolutely “other” 
world to humans, i.e., a de-humanized world. Yet it is not a world that 
receives life from a transcendent God, nor a world believed to receive 
life from a loving God who is deeply immanent in both the world and man. 
It also differs from the world of the unio mystica (assuming such a union 
is possible). It is a “de-theized” world, in which God has been completely 
negated and cast off.
The world of pure Nothingness (or Awakening) establishes itself in 
absolute Nothingness. It has divested itself of all human nature and is 
absolutely other to man, yet does not turn from humanity to divinity. It 
transcends all aspects of man and God, the profane and the sacred, time 
and eternity, philosophy and religion, knowledge and faith. It brings about 
the absolute transcendence of transcendence, though not in the direction 
of some distant beyond: the very standpoint of transcendence is inverted 
from its foundation. This is a fundamental conversion of all things, in­
cluding even the standpoint of immanence transcended by transcendence. 
And yet, this transcendence exists right here in the present; eternity is 
realized as the present, and that which is absolutely other is precisely one’s 
own True Self. Such is the true aspect of pure Nothingness as Awakening.
Since Nothingness in this sense is found only in the spiritual heritage of 
the East, Hisamatsu terms it “Oriental Nothingness.” As he himself 
points out, however, this signifies that it is historically unique to the East, 
not peculiar to it. In essence, it can be found universally in both the East 
and the West. If peculiar to anything, it is peculiar to human beings.
The fact that pure Nothingness is peculiar to man becomes clearer if we 
recall that the standpoint of Awakening emerges because man’s subjective, 
absolute antinomy is cast off autonomously, and also that the resultant 
rebirth is autonomous as well. This self-extrication does not occur by means 
of an other. The self autonomously extricates itself (jiko ga jiritsu-teki ni 
datsuji suru fl fl T6): this means that the True Self awakens
of itself. Autonomous self-extrication in this sense is peculiar to man’s 
self-conscious existence. When Hisamatsu equated the world of Awaken­
ing with the world of pure Nothingness, he designated Nothingness as 
“subjective Nothingness” (shutai-teki mu a clarification he con­
sidered essential for the philosophy of Awakening.
Pure Nothingness as Awakening has a cosmological character. In Zen, 
it has been compared to an “empty sky”; it has been expressed as “Mind 
without form, filling the ten directions.” When pure Nothingness as
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Awakening is realized through the autonomous self-extrication described 
above, however, it goes beyond cosmological nothingness. It is, above all, 
subjective Nothingness. That is the reason Hisamatsu not only spoke of 
pure Nothingness (Awakening) as Absolute Nothingness, but further 
designated it as “subjective Nothingness.”
Although pure Nothingness as Awakening is a subjective Nothingness 
peculiar to man, subjective existence here means something different from 
ordinary human subjectivity. It is a subjective existence realized as a result 
of “de-humanization,” the discarding of human nature in all its forms. 
The traditional Zen expressions of this are extremely apt. “Your Original 
Face before your parents were born,” and the “True Person without Rank,” 
are two examples. In elucidating this philosophy of Awakening, Hisamatsu 
expressed it as “subjective existence as Nothingness” (mu-teki shutai 
ft) to show that it was not subjectivity-as-being, but formless subjective ex­
istence (mush no shutai *MEO±ft).
vn
In the world of Awakening, then, Nothingness is subjective Nothingness, 
and subjective existence is subjectivity as Nothingness. This means that 
Nothingness as Awakening is originally the extrication of the self from 
itself (datsuji KL&). Radically self-extricating oneself from the self-as-being 
(that is, the self as an entity; u-teki jiko S), or rather, the subjective
act of so doing, is the manifestation of “Nothingness.” Nothingness as 
Awakening, then, is not a matter called “Nothingness” but the absolute 
act of self-extricating oneself from the self-as-being. The self-as-being, 
however, cannot, as it is, self-extricate itself. This is the inevitable fate of 
the self-as-being, the subjective absolute antinomy mentioned before.
Self-extrication implies essentially the emergence of the emancipated 
Self, brought about only through one’s own power. Extrication from the 
self-as-being actually occurs not by virtue of the self-as-being, but because 
the emancipated Self manifests itself. Consequently, the fact that Nothing­
ness is essentially the absolute act of self-extrication signifies that Nothing­
ness is originally the autonomous emergence of the self-extricated Self 
(datsuji-teki jiko no jiritsu-teki genj6 SO the act ex­
pressed in the word “awaken.”
Nothingness as Awakening is thus in no way an objectifiable something 
called “Nothingness,” or any other matter outside the subjective Self.
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It is, in every respect, “subjective Nothingness.” In this case, “subjective” 
should not be understood to imply that the self-extrication is brought 
about by the self-as-being; the subject of self-extrication is the originally 
emancipated Self, “subjective existence as Nothingness.” Although 
“subjective Nothingness” and “subjective existence as Nothingness” are 
two different verbal expressions, they point to one essential functioning, 
or Act (Tat): the functioning called “Nothingness,” the act called 
“Awakening.”
Awakening, then, as a subjective act, is essentially an autonomous self­
extrication. More precisely, it is the self-extricated Self autonomously 
manifesting itself, an absolutely subjective and, at the same time, absolutely 
objective event transcendent of the self-as-being. It is to discover oneself 
in the boundless expanse of Self-Awakening which opens out in a vast, 
clear immensity upon the dissolution of Great Doubt. In this boundless 
expanse of Self-A wakening, free of all spatial restriction or temporal begin­
ning and end, one self-awakens to a new Self. This expanse is prior to the 
separation of subject and object, and, as in the Zen phrase, “prior to the 
first portents of the sprouting of life.” To the self-as-being, it is a world of 
utter newness, completely “other,” and its discovery occasions great 
surprise and joy. It is, as such, the fully emancipated, self-extricated Self. 
The emergence of this Self is none other than the manifestation of the 
clearly expanding openness of Self-Awakening. To the self-extricated Self, 
this boundless expanse is the Se^in its originality. The absolute present is 
realized here.
In Awakening, that which awakens and that which is awakened to are 
one. This is because within the total, subjective Act (Tat) expressed in 
the word “awaken,” the casting off of the self-as-being is precisely the 
emergence of the clear expanse of Self-A wakening—the true manifestation 
of the self-extricated Original Self in which subject-object duality is com­
pletely overcome. In the clear and unrestricted emergence of the expanse of 
Self-Awakening (the absolute Act designated by the word “awaken”), 
the Self is the Self in its original form, and all things, as themselves, are 
self-attaining. This state of affairs is the totally awakened absolute present.
This Awakening is the source, or starting point, of all things. The bound­
less expanse of the self-extricated Self opens out, permeating all things in 
their entirety. Speaking from the relative standpoint prior to this opening 
out, Self-Awakening may be said to flow backward into every limited
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thing. Emerging here is the world in which each and every being is per­
fectly fulfilled: “Mountains are just mountains, rivers just rivers,” “The 
inlet moon shines, the pine wind blows.” It is the world of Suchness, 
where “The sound of a mountain stream preaches with the eloquence of 
Buddha, and the shapes of the mountains are pure Buddha-body.” Such 
recountings of the landscape of satori in traditional Zen are a function of 
Zen’s cosmological character. The source of it all is the self-extricated 
realization Hisamatsu calls “Awakening.”
The autonomy of his self-extricated realization is sharp and clear to an 
extent never before seen in the long history of Zen. This accounts for the 
following two salient characteristics of the world of his Awakening.
The first is the emphasis on the subjectivity and self-nature of Awaken­
ing. This links directly with the emphasis placed on the original-ness of 
Awakening, on abrupt awakening and its wholeness and purity, and on 
complete denial of the “process” of gradual awakening. While it is true 
that “other-ness” of other existence and the recurrence of Awakening after 
satori are not greatly emphasized in Hisamatsu’s standpoint of Awakening, 
that does not mean that they are disregarded. The subjectivity stressed in 
the standpoint of Awakening is beyond the dichotomy of self and other, 
and Awakening, however abrupt, is constantly self-renewing. These points 
are included as a matter of course, and in both of them, the subjectivity, 
self-nature, and originalness of Awakening, and the wholeness of imme­
diate awakening, are all clearly and emphatically stressed.
The second distinctive characteristic of the world of his Awakening is the 
emphasis on humans and history. Hisamatsu advocated a new humanism 
as a standpoint of all mankind. This does not mean nonhuman sentient 
beings and nature are ignored. The universality of the standpoint of 
Awakening is, as mentioned above, cosmological. Hisamatsu, however, 
emphasizes man in his standpoint of Awakening because the cosmological 
perspective is often misconstrued to mean a mere naturalism or animism, 
thus obscuring both the subjective self-extricated realization—which makes 
the cosmological perspective possible—and its autonomy. This again links 
directly to his emphasis on the “creation of history.” Without keeping in 
mind that his standpoint of “Awakening” emerges through the realization 
of the self-contradictoriness pervading modern autonomous reason, we 
cannot fully understand the reason for his advocation of F.A.S.—To 
awaken to the Formless Self, to stand in the standpoint of -411 mankind,
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and to create Suprahistorical history—as that which expresses true Zen.
* ♦ ♦
The content of the “philosophy of Awakening” can be summed up in 
the following five points:
1. The philosophy of Awakening is the philosophy of the Formless 
Self.
2. The philosophy of Awakening is the philosophy of unified study 
and practice.
3. The philosophy of Awakening is the philosophy standing upon 
alternative universality.
4. The philosophy of Awakening is the philosophy inseparable from 
method.
5. The philosophy of Awakening is the philosophy of creation and 
compassion.
In this essay, I have attempted to describe how Hisamatsu’s philosophy of 
Awakening came to be realized, and to explain what its standpoint is. An 
elucidation of the content of the “philosophy of Awakening” will 
have to be reserved for a future article.
Translated by Christopher A. Ives
42
